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FOREWORD: IS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION SUCCESS
WORTH ITS POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY PRICE?
Robert F. Williams*
Constitutional revision is not for the faint of heart. It is not a
Sunday drive in the mountains. It is an incredibly difficult,
sometimes tedious, sometimes exhilarating, always a
challenging undertaking requiring the cooperation of the
leadership of all three branches of state government, of
counties and municipalities, of local school boards, of the
business community and the labor community, of public
interest groups and private interest groups, of people inside
the government and people outside the government-in short,
it requires the cooperation of just about everybody. In fact,
with apologies for the hyperbole, I almost would go so far as
to say that the confluence of factors needed to bring about the
ratification of a new state constitution approaches that needed
for the creation of life itself!
GeorgiaGovernor George D. Busbee (1983)'

* Distinguished Professor ofLaw, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. B.A., 1967,
Florida State University; J.D., 1969, University of FloridaCollege ofLaw; LL.M., 1971, New York
University School of Law; LL.M., 1980, Columbia University School of Law. The author served
as a legislative aide during the drafting of the Florida Constitution of 1968, represented clients
before the 1978 Florida Constitution Revision Commission, and addressed the 1998 Florida
Constitution Revision Commission. He teaches State Constitutional Law at Rutgers, and is the
author of STATE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1999) published by the
Lexis Law Publishing Company, and THENEWJERSEY STATECONSTITUTION: AREFERENCEGUIDE
(rev. ed. 1997) published by Rutgers University Press.
1. George D. Busbee, An Overview of the New Georgia Constitution,35 MERCER L. REV.
1, 1-2 (1983).
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All political power is inherent in the people.2
I am honored to write this Foreword to the Law Review's symposium
on the recent adoption of the Constitution Revision Commission's
suggested changes to the Florida Constitution. The faculty at the University
of Florida College of Law and the editors of the Law Review must be
commended for taking on this important and timely topic. After all, as
Professor Richard Kay of the University of Connecticut School of Law has
observed:
The transformation of a law school from an institution of
vocational competence into one of intellectual excellence is
often associated with an increased attention to legal subjects
that are national in scope....
It is also true, however, that this broadening of interest
need not be accompanied by an abandonment of a special
concern for the legal issues and problems that are peculiar to
a law school's home.3
Florida constitutional law has long interested me, as a student, as a
participant in Florida constitutional revision,5 as a commentator' on Florida
Constitutional Law, and as a speaker to this most recent Commission.7
The members of the 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission
(Commission) were certainly not persons who were "faint of heart." The
Commission succeeded in achieving a number of important revisions to
Florida's constitution. These changes were accomplished through the
process described above by Governor Busbee. Members of the
Commission will agree, I am sure, that the work was "incredibly difficult,

2. FLA.CONST. art. I,§ 1.

3. Richard S. Kay, The Jurisprudenceof the Connecticut Constitution, 16 CONN. L. REV.
667, 667 (1984).
4. See generally Robert F. Williams, Note, Property Tax Exemptions UnderArticle VII,
Section 3(a) of the Florida Constitutionof 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 641 (1969).
5. See Robert F. Williams, A Generationof Change in FloridaState ConstitutionalLaw,
5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 133, 136-39 (1992) [hereinafter A Generation of Change]; Stephen T.
Maher, The Conference on the FloridaConstitution,68 FLA. B.J., Dec. 1994, at 66,67 n. 10; Robert
F. Williams, The Anatomy of Law Reform: Dissectinga Decade of Change in FloridaIn Forma
PauperisLaw, 12 STETSON L. REV. 363, 385-86 (1982) [hereinafter Anatomy of Law Reform].
6. See Robert F. Williams, Introduction:The Stories ofState ConstitutionalLaw,18 NOVA
L. REV. 715 (1994) (introducing the Symposium on Florida Constitutional Law).
7. See Robert F. Williams, The FloridaConstitutionRevision Commission in Historicand
NationalContext, 50 FLA. L.REV. 215 (1998) (address to Commission). The original address was
published in the JoURNAL oPTHE 1997-1998 CONSTrrION REVISION COMMISSION 14 (Tuesday,
June 17, 1997).
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sometimes tedious, sometimes exhilarating, always challenging....' 8 The
Commissioners' participation reflected a tremendous commitment to
public service. In Florida, of course, it could never have been a "Sunday
drive in the mountains."
Throughout the history of our country, the states have been
experimenting both with the processes by which state constitutions are
drafted, adopted, amended, and revised, as well as with the content of state
constitutions. The recent Florida state constitutional revisions are a pro duct
of the latest in a continuing series of experiments with the processes of
state constitutional change. The substantive content of the new changes
will have to be subjected to the tests of time and judgements of history,
illuminated from the beginning, to be sure, by the light shed on them by the
articles in this symposium.
The standard approach to revising American state constitutions has
been the constitutional convention. This is a mechanism that makes the
maximum use of popular sovereignty or the voters' expressed will. As I
have said elsewhere, "the use of a constitutional convention usually relies
on three expressions of popular will: deciding the question whether there
should be a convention, electing the delegates, and voting on whether to
ratify the convention's recommendations." 9 Thus, conventions used to have
a high degree of popular legitimacy. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
noted:
It must be remembered that the Convention method,
whether limited or unlimited, is subjected to two votes by the
people, the ultimate repository of all power. The primary
purpose of the call vote is to determine whether or not the
people are willing topermita convention to consideraltering,
amending or abolishing the whole Constitution, or specified
parts thereof. An affirmative vote for a convention, for limited
or unlimited purposes, is a grant by the people to a historic
deliberative body to write constitutional, fundamental law as
distinguished from statutory law. Imperfection in the call,
such as affirmative proposals exceeding the limits heretofore
defined, does not invalidate the amending process. The
second vote ratifies or rejects the word for word end result of
the Convention's deliberative effort. The final validating step
by the people is the most significant action in the entire
amending process.°

8. See supra note 1, at 1.
9. Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The
IncreasingRole of the ConstitutionalCommission In State ConstitutionalChange, 1 HoFsTRA L.
&POL'Y SYMP. 1, 3 (1996).
10. Snow v.City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55, 63-64 (Tenn. 1975), appealdismissed, 423
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If Governor Busbee of Georgia was correct in 1983 when he said, based
on his experience, "Constitutional revision is not for the faint of heart,""
then Floridians are the least fainthearted people in the United States when
it comes to state constitutional revision. Florida is generally considered to
have the most easily changed state constitution in the country." This is
because, in addition to the more common mechanisms of constitutional
convention, legislatively-proposed amendment, and citizen initiative,
Florida also utilizes its unique, appointed Constitution Revision
Commission which may put its proposals directly on the ballot. 13 Although
this mechanism was invented in 1968, the 1978 Commission's proposals
were rejected at the polls, making this most recent experience the first
successful utilization of the full Commission mechanism.
People differ, of course, on whether they believe that it is better for a
state constitution to be easily amended or more difficult to amend. For
most people, this question will even depend on the nature of the proposal
itself that is being considered. In other words, rarely do people speculate
on this question in the abstract, but rather wait to confront it when they are
faced with a proposal they either support or oppose. It is in that context that
the question of ease of amending state constitutions usually arises.

U.S. 1083 (1976).
11. See supra note 1, at 1.
12. See TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
146 (1991) ("The Constitution of Florida has more processes for amendment and revision than any
other state constitution."); see also Joseph W. Little & Julius Medenblik, Restricting Legislative
Amendments to the Constitution,60 FLA. B.J., Jan. 1986, at 43; Albert L. Sturm & Janice C. May,
State Constitutionsand ConstitutionalRevision: 1980-81 and the Past50 Years, in 24 THE BOOK
OFTHE STATES 1982-83, at 115, 116-18 (1982).
Interestingly, one can make the argument that the easier it is to amend a state's constitution, the
more rigid its court's adherence should be to the doctrine of staredecisisfor decisions interpreting
the state constitution. Justice Brandeis' famous defense of a reduced weight of stare decisis for
United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal constitution was based on the difficulty
of overruling such interpretations. See Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,409 n.5
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis, however, specifically excluded state constitutional
interpretations from his argument, stating that "It]he policy of stare decisis may be more
appropriately applied to constitutional questions arising under the fundamental laws of those States
whose constitution may be easily amended. The action following the decision in Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271 .... shows how promptly a state constitution may be amended to
correct an important decision deemed wrong." Id. No Florida court appears to have addressed this
point. See generally Thad B. Zmistowski, Note, City of Portland v. DePaolo: Defining The Role
ofStareDecisis in State ConstitutionalDecisionmaking,41 ME. L. REv. 201(1989). But see James
C. Rehnquist, The Power that ShallBe Vested in a Precedent:Stare Decisis, the Constitutionand
the Supreme Court,66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 351-52 (1986) (arguing that other factors than just ease
of amendment should support reduced weight of precedent in constitutional interpretation).
13. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 12, at 15-16; Steven J. Uhlfelder, The Machinery of
Revision, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 575 (1978).
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The Florida Constitution Revision Commission operates with many of
the attributes of a state constitutional convention, but it does not have the
first two expressions of popular will described above. It could, therefore,
be viewed as having less popular legitimacy than a convention. There can
be no prior restraint, imposed by the people, on the consideration of state
constitutional revision; the only limits come through the Commission's
own self-imposed restraint. 4 The commissioners are not, technically,7
6
"representatives." 5 Voting Rights Act and one-person-one-vote issues,
arguably applicable to constitutional conventions, do not arise with respect
to the choice of the Commission's members. Florida's Commission is a
reflection, albeit a unique manifestation, of a much larger national trend in
state constitutionalism. As noted by Alan Tan, the earlier reliance on
popular sovereignty and state constitutional conventions has been giving
way to an increased influence of professional reformers and political elites,
thus reflecting probably "the most striking trend" in twentieth century state
constitutional politics."8
In some ways, it is even a misnomer to refer to the Florida body as a
"commission." The word itself connotes a principal/agent relationship of
some sort, and until Florida's new invention in 1968, constitutional
commissions had served their creators rather than acting independently,
like constitutional conventions. Commissions had only been used:
1) in conjunction with constitutional conventions, either to
help implement their work after a failure at the polls, or
through background study and analysis to lay the groundwork
14. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
15. See generallyRobert S. Friedman & Sybil L. Stokes, The Role of Constitution-Maker
as Representative, 9 MIDWEST J. POL SCL 148 (1965), reprinted in JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN,
SUBNATIONALPOTICS: READINGS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 76 (2d ed. 1970).
16. See Richard Briffault, The Voting Rights Act and the Election of Delegates to a
Constitutional Convention, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN NEW YORK 445
(Gerald Benjamin & Henrik N. Dullea eds., 1997).

17. See id. at 456-57; Priest v. Polk, 912 S.W.2d 902 (Ark. 1995) (concluding that the oneperson-one-vote principle was inapplicableto state constitutional conventions).
18. G. Alan Tarr, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTrrTUIONS 170 (1998) ("Perhaps the most

striking trend is toward the professionalization of state constitutional change. Illustrative of this
shift is the decline of the constitutional convention. In the nineteenth century, conventions served
as a mechanism for popular influence on politics, often called by reluctant officials in response to
popular pressures. But in the twentieth century far fewer conventions have been called, and their
character has changed. Typically, it has been political elites and professional reformers who have
campaigned for constitutional revision, with the populace reduced to rejecting convention calls and
proposed constitutions to register its distrust of a process that it no longer feels it controls. The
professionalization of state constitutional change is also evident in the increasing use of

constitutional commissions, expert bodies established without popular input, to set the agenda of
constitutional change, identifying the problems that deserve attention and the appropriate solutions
to those problems.").
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for such conventions; 2) as devices for assisting legislatures
in avoiding conventions, and thus retaining control of
constitutional change; [or] 3) to work together with the
legislative branch in studying and recommending state
constitutional change ......
Under none of these circumstances could a commission place its
recommended changes directly on the ballot. It was, rather, implementing
its commission, direction, or mandate, from another body or officer that
would review its work. Certainly the Florida Commission is not subject to
such review and cannot be accused of being beholden to the Legislature!'
Further, Florida's new innovation does not rely on either of the
justifications for use of commissions in the past: expertise and efficiency.2"
Still, however, as noted above, the Commission has a number of
attributes of an unlimited constitutional convention. I told the Commission,
in an introductory address:

19. Williams, supra note 9, at 4.
20. James Henretta made the following criticisms ofother legislatively-created commissions:
In many other states, such as Georgia in the 1940's and Kentucky and California
in the 1960s, legislatures dispensed completely with a constitutional convention.
To meet the pressing need for the reform of outmoded constitutional structures,
the legislatures appointed commissions to consider revisions and to report their
recommendations. These commissions were not democratic bodies responsible to
the people. Their proposals came before the voters only after being carefully
reviewed and revised by legislators, governors, and other state officials.
Whatever the gloss.., the commission revision process... represented a
diminution of activist popular sovereignty. In a carefully calculated fashion, these
maneuvers removed power from the hands of the citizenry. The result was a
constitution revised as much through administrative procedures as through
constitutional debate and political compromise.
James A. Henretta, Foreword:Rethinking the State ConstitutionalTradition,22 RuTGERs L.J. 819,
830-31 (1991). For excellent analysis of the origins of the importance of popular sovereignty in
state constitutionalism, see Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions ofAmerican Constitutionalism:
PopularSovereigntyandtheEarlyAmerican ConstitutionalDebate,24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287
(1997).
21. See Williams, supra note 9, at 9:
The constitutional commissions came into beingin New York and New Jersey
based on the justifications of efficiency and expertise, neither of which were
regarded, according to Galie's analysis, as attributes of the constitutional
convention ("cumbersome") or the legislative amendment process ("ad hoc"). The
commission, under these circumstances, served as a research and study group
(expertise) and as a technique for agenda-setting in the legislature (efficiency).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/1
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You should consider yourselves a constitutional convention
because you will operate from here forward with all of the
attributes of a constitutional convention in the traditional
sense, except that you don't have an elective constituency.
Maybe that's a good thing, for a lot of you it's probably a
relief. Each one of you now has a statewide constituency
which in other respects is only shared by the Governor, the
Cabinet members and the United States Senators from
Florida.'
The unique Florida Commission mechanism, which was premised on the
need felt in the 1960s for a periodic reconsideration of the state
constitution, is thus made more effective by a corresponding reduction in
the role of popular sovereignty. This model "operates to shift the burden
of political inertia away from the status quo and toward the possibility of
change."' The Commission's mandate is unlimited, and, apparently,
unlimitable.' This is evidence of the optimistic faith in future generations
exhibited by the framers of the 1968 Constitution and the voters who
ratified it. The 1997-98 Commission's work was characterized by prudence
and a spirit of compromise, both self-imposed limitations.
Florida's choice in 1968 to embark on a new experiment with an
automatic, appointed revision commission was a practical response to the
real problem of experience with constitutional rigidity, rather than a
response based on theory. The commission idea, though, was not only
based on concern aboutpast rigidity; it was grounded as well on optimism
concerning future possibilities in coming generations, unattainable in 1968,
such as judicial and cabinet reform. The 1968 innovation was a leap of
faith into the future, a license to later generations with no guarantees as to
the substantive outcomes that would flow from the new process.2 At the
operational level, it binds future generations to consider state constitutional
revision without mandating that any change actually be approved.
The 1968 Florida Constitution, with its important new content and
22. Williams, supra note 7, at 222. For a comprehensive analysis of the politics of state
constitutional

conventions, see ELMER E. CORNWELL ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTrIONAL

CONVENTIONS: THE POLITICS OFTHE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES (1975).
23. Williams, supra note 7, at 222.
24. See id. at 223 ("Yours is an unlimited commission. I think that's good and bad. You have
an open mandate. But it means you'll have to focus; you'll have to set priorities. You'll probably
have to limit yourselves."). This unlimited quality is one of Professor Little's major criticisms. See
Joseph W. Little, The Need to Revise the Constitution Revision Commission, 52 FLA. L. REV. 475

(2000).
25. Professor Little provides a different assessment, concluding that the Revision
Commission idea was "slipped by or gobbled down by the electorate without a hiccup." Little,
supra note 24, at 477.
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constitutional change processes, was one of the outcomes of the change in
the Florida Legislature following the one-person-one-vote revolution.26
Earlier attempts to stimulate the malapportioned Legislature to consider
state constitutional change had failed.27 The automatic, appointed
commission idea is the logical outgrowth of the periodic, automatic
referendum on whether to call a constitutional convention. Although this
idea has apparently been considered for adoption in a few other states, so
far none has emulated Florida's experiment.' The following excerpts from
the debates in the 1967 New York Constitutional Convention illustrate
some of the concerns about such commissions:
MR. SHAPIRO: Mr. President and gentlemen: This matter
was very carefully considered by the members of the
Committee on the Legislature. We have before us a number
of proposals similar in character, although not in every detail
as the Cooper proposal .... We went through them very, very
thoroughly and the members came to the conclusion that it
would be a very dangerous practice to have a commission not
elected by the people and over whom they had no control to
propose amendments and then necessarily have those go on
the ballot to be voted upon by the people without any choice
by anybody as to whether they should go or should not go
without any veto power.
MR. COOPER: Mr. President, I would just like to make the
following brief comments on the criticisms. First of all, I am
very happy that at least it has focused [sic] some attention on
what I consider to be a problem in the minds of most of us
here.

26. See D'ALEMBERTE, supra note 12, at 12; A Generation of Change, supra note 5, at 135.

This was part of a national trend:
[S]tate legislatures have once again become relatively democratic and
representative bodies as a result of the reapportionment revolution begun in 1962
by Bakerv. Carr.Not accidentally, that decision spurred a wave of constitutional
revision. No fewer than thir een states revised their basic charters between 1963
and 1976, reviving at least in part, the tradition of activist popular sovereignty.
Henretta, supra note 20, at 839.
27. See, e.g., William C. Havard, Notes on a Theory of State ConstitutionalChange: The
FloridaExperience, 21 J. POL. 80 (1959). See generally Albert L. Sturm, The Procedureof State
ConstitutionalChange-With Special Emphasis on the South and Florida,5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.

569 (1977).

28. See John Dinan, "'The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation:' A Reevaluation
of the American State Constitutional Tradition," Paper delivered at 1999 American Political
Science Association Meeting, at 17 n.50 (on file with author).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/1
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With respect to some of the comments made by Judge
Shapiro, I think you ought to be aware that the people who
would be responsible for the commission would be the
elected public officials, except for the case of the Board of
Regents. These elected public officials would be charged with
the responsibility and would be answerable to the people that
they selected to this commission, and in the final analysis,
nothing that the commission would have done would have
been without the approval of the people finally when it came
to ratifying the work of this commission.29
The Florida appointed commissionprocess has worked now twice this
generation, after the "failed"30 1978 Commission. The Tax and Budget
Reform Commission, modeled directly on the Constitution Revision
Commission, successfully met and proposed revisions which were adopted
in 1992.3 ' Florida has, thus, been relatively successful in updating its
constitution over the past several generations. Professor Little's article,
however, disagrees with this assessment.32
Other states, by contrast, have had difficulty in the past generation
stimulating public support for a process of even considering state
constitutional change. Most recently, in 1997, despite strong bipartisan
support,33 New Yorkers voted against calling a state constitutional
convention in a referendum held automatically every 20 years.34 Illinois

29. 3 PROCEEDINGS OFTHE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OFTHE STATE OFNEW YORK 2829 (1967); see also 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII, 1978, at
109-12 (1980) (proposal for an appointed commission with authority to put proposals directly on
the ballot rejected in committee). I am indebted to Dr. John Dinan not only for pointing out the
existence of the debates on this question, but also for locating them and sending me copies.
30. The failure was short-lived. See generally D'Alemberte, supra note 12, at 15; Steven J.
Uhfelder & Robert A. McNeely, The 1978 ConstitutionRevision Commission:Florida'sBlueprint
for Change, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1489 (1994); infra note 92 and accompanying text. For a complete
analysis of the 1978 Commission's proposals, see Symposium on the ProposedRevisions to the
FloridaConstitution,6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 565 (1978).
31. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 6. See generally Donna Blanton, The Taxation and Budget
Reform Commission: Florida'sBest Hope for the Future, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 437 (1991); A
Generationof Change, supra note 5, at 137 n.23.
32. See generally Little, supra note 24.
33. See Mario N. Cuomo & Gerald Benjamin, New Yorkers Need a Constitutional
Convention, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1997, at A22; Alan Finder, GridlockedState Government Needs
an Overhaul PanelSays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at 25; Richard Prez-Pefia, Scorn forAlbany
Unites Forces Urging a New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at 31.
34. See Richard Prez-Pefia, Voters Refuse to Take Chances on Bond Act and Convention,
N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at B3; Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional
Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 53, 70 (1996) (describing opposition to
convention). See generallyJanice C. May, Amending State Constitutions, 1996-97, 30 RUTGERS
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voters, in a similar automatic referendum, rejected a convention in 1988."5
Florida's periodic Commission, however, is constituted automatically
every 20 years, without preliminary input from the current generation. The
1968 ratification of this idea by those voters, its source of popular
legitimacy, continues in force until changed.
There has developed what Gerald Benjamin and Thomas Gais call
"conventionphobia" in this country.3 6 This resistance to a constitutional
convention is not just a national phenomenon, resisting a federal
constitutional convention, but also manifests itself at the state level,
leading to resistance to state constitutional conventions. As noted above,
even states with an automatic vote on whether to call a convention have
not had recent success. "In the quarter century between 1960 and 1985
automatic convention calls were approved only in New Hampshire, Rhode
Island and Alaska.... In each of four states that provided for an automatic
convention call during the early 1990s-Alaska, New Hampshire, Ohio
and Michigan-majorities have rejected the opportunity." 37 This resistance
to the calling of conventions has been occurring at the same time that
widespread dissatisfaction with state government has been increasing. The
public seems to view the possibility of a constitutional convention as
political business as usual by the "government industry."38 Constitutional
conventions seem to have lost their legitimacy in the public mind.
Under these circumstances, in states like Florida that permit the state
constitution to be amended through the initiative, that avenue is likely to
be seen by the public as having more popular legitimacy than a convention.
But the initiative lacks the possibility of deliberation.39 Gais and Benjamin

L.J. 1025 (1999).

35. See Janice C. May, State Constitutionsand ConstitutionalRevision: 1988-89 and the
1980sin 28 THE BOOKOFTHE STATES 1990-91, at 20, 22-23 (1991). The Illinois Constitution had
undergone a major revision in 1970, and many thoughtful people concluded there was no need for

a convention.
36. Benjamin & Gais, supra note 34, at 70.
37. Id. at 69. Benjamin and Gais had observed a year earlier:
The number of active constitutional conventions has also dropped from seven
between 1968 and 1969, to just two between 1978 and 1979, to none between
1990 and 1991. Moreover, all of the convention calls that some states are required
to put on their ballots have gone down to defeat in recent years: New Hampshire,
Alaska, and Montana placed such questions before the voters between 1990 and
1992, but all were defeated, as was Michigan's in 1994.
Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, PublicDiscontentand the Declineof Deliberation:A Dilemma
in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 1303 (1995) [hereinafter Public
Discontent].
38. Public Discontent,supra note 37, at 1304; Benjamin & Gais, supra note 34, at 71.
39. See PublicDiscontent,supra note 37, at 1301:

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/1
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conclude:
What we need instead are constitutional revision
procedures that are deliberative as well as
legitimate-procedures that command legitimacy by
providing for direct citizen participation and control, but that
also generate and assess alternative proposals, take into
account the best available information about their likely
effects, consider the interactions between the proposed
changes and the rest of the constitutional structure, and afford
opportunities for discussion and accommodation among
significant political interests.'
Interestingly, this sounds like a description of Florida's Constitution
Revision Commission process, both in 1978 and in 1997-98. Is Florida's
solution the answer other states are looking for? Do these attributes,
fostering widespread deliberation in the modem information and
transportation age, compensate for reduced popular sovereignty
(legitimacy?) at the outset of the process?
Gais and Benjamin called for another characteristic for meaningful,
publicly acceptable state constitutional revision: independence.41 The
initiative method also provides independence but, as mentioned before,
does not provide for deliberation.Based on this, I suggested to the Florida
Commission:

A more important question is whether the constitutional initiative is a
deliberativeprocess, one that involves discussion, learning, and accommodation

among all citizens or their representatives regarding common problems.
Deliberation is crucial in settling constitutional questions. If we want people to
view a constitution as legitimate, we must be sure they believe the rules and
institutions it prescribes to be reasonable and fair. That is not an easy task,
particularly now, when government institutions must often make decisions which

many citizens and interest groups oppose.
Id. For a critical evaluation of the initiative process, see Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword:The Direct
Ballot andState Constitutionalism,28 RUTGERS L.J. 787 (1997); see also Eric Lane, Men Are Not
Angels: The Realpolitikof DirectDemocracyand What We Can Do About It, 34 WIIAMETE L.
REV. 579 (1998). For critiques aimed specifically at Florida, see Thomas C. Marks, Jr.,
ConstitutionalChange InitiatedBy The People: One State's Unhappy Experience, 68 TEMP. L.
REV. 1241 (1995); Joseph W. Little, Does DirectDemocracyThreatenConstitutionalGovernance
in Florida?,24 STETsON L. REV. 393 (1995). For a more neutral analysis, see Jim Smith, So You
Want to Amend the Florida Constitution?A Guide to Initiative Petitions, 18 NOvAL. REV. 1509

(1994).
40. Public Discontent,supra note 37, at 1303.
41. Public Discontent,supra note 37, at 1299.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVEW

[V/ol. 52

The question, I think, is quite clearly whether you as a
Commission can operate in a way that will convince the
public that you are independent of the regular processes of
government. I think you have the potential to do that. Gerald
Benjamin says, "To channel the public discontent now
targeted at state governments we need a method of
constitutional revision which is independent of existing
governmental institutions."
Try, if you can, to distance yourself somewhat from your
current, regular constituency. You do have a statewide
constituency now. If you can, distance yourself from your
appointing authority, at least in some respects. You need to do
this to make the inside job work, to be able to work together
over the next year in this process. It's going to go beyond the
next year if you think about the ratification campaign, if you
suggest any changes. You need to have independence to work
inside this chamber together and also to present an
independent face to the public. Selling your product to the
public is your outside job.42
Apparently, looking back at the process, the Commission was able to
operate in a way that did not present merely a "government industry"
picture to the Florida voters. The makeup of the Commission did, in fact,
include a number of individuals who were not governmental officials,
although they were appointed by government officials.4 3
So, the question to be asked by Floridians, as well as those in other
states who are watching Florida's experiment in the processes of state
constitutionmaking, is whether the very expansive deliberativerecord of
the commission, its arguable independence, and its success in convincing
the voters to accept its proposals make up for its seemingly reduced
legitimacy on account of its appointed, rather than elected, membership.
Clearly the Commission seems to have met the central challenge of state
constitutional revision, delineated by the leading scholars of state
constitutional conventions:
In short, constitutional revision potentially polarizes state
communities, or the attentive portions of them, along
predictable lines. Change and reform must win acceptance
42. Williams, supra note 7, at 226, 228.
43. See W. Dexter Douglass, The 1997-98 Constitution Revision Commission: Valuable
Lessonsfrom a Successful Commission,52 FLA. L.REV. 275,277 n.12 (2000). Professor Little sees
this as a major defect in the commission mechanism, concluding that the appointees follow the
political agenda and government branch loyalty of theirrespective appointing authorities. See Little,
supra note 24, at 477-78.
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against groups and points of view that are latent in every state
and, experience has shown, are readily mobilized. Thus the
politics of the constitutional revision pose the central problem
of achieving enough reform to satisfy those who favor and
work for such efforts, but at the same time not so much as to
frighten or alienate too many vested interests or too many of
the potential opponents in the citizenry.'
The Commission seems, as well, to have been able to mesh the politics of
state constitutional revision with ongoing Florida and national politics.45
The processes of preparing for and carrying through the Commission's
mandate is explained in a revealing fashion in the article by Chairman W.
Dexter Douglass.4 6 Of particular interest is the importance of the
Commission's self-imposed super-majority rule,47 and the preparatory
work performed by the Constitution Revision Commission's Steering
Committee that was created by Governor Chiles' Executive Order.48 This
Steering Committee adopted a draft of rules of procedure, made
provisional staffing decisions, and prepared and submitted a budget to the
legislature for the Commission's work.
The new gun control amendment, and particularly the political process
leading to its adoption, is explained in the article by Katherine Rundle and
Paul Mendelson.4 9 This provision, a compromise permitting counties to
impose restrictions on firearms sales at gun shows, builds upon an earlier
1991 amendment to the constitution. 0 The new amendment functions, in
effect, to overrule a statute withdrawing authority over such regulations
from counties.5" An extremely interesting technique used by the proponents
44. CORNWELLET AL., supra note 22, at 206.
45. See CORNWELLETAL, supra note 22, at 192:
The first point we stressed is that constitutional revision is a political process.
As such it does tap the full range of motives and interests called into play by the
other political subprocesses at the state level. And like these other forms of state
politics, it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in response to local differences
in political culture and style.
See generally CONSTITUTIONAL POLrTCS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND

HIsTORIcAL PATTERNS (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 1996).
46. Douglass, supra note 43, at 275; see also Talbot D'Alemberte, Essay, The 1997-98
Constitution Revision Commission: Reflections and Commentaryfrom the Commission's First
Chairman,25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1997).

47. See Douglass, supra note 43, at 278.
48. See Douglass, supra note 43, at 276-78.
49. See Katherine Fernandez Rundle & Paul Mendelson, Closing The Deadly Loopholes in
the FirearmsLaws: The History and Impact of Amendment 12, 52 FLA. L. REV. 457 (2000).
50. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(b).
51. See Rundle & Mendelson, supra note 49, at 458, n. 1.
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of the amendment was to utilize a public opinion poll during the
deliberations of the Commission to convince the membership that such an
amendment was politically palatable to the voters.52 This is reminiscent of
a suggestion made by Benjamin and Gais for the use of "deliberative
opinion polls."5 " The entire area of gun control has been one where there
has been
increasing activity at the state constitutional level in recent
54
years.
The amendment bringing at least partial reform 5 to the Cabinet is
analyzed in historical and political context by Deborah Kearney.5 6 These
changes, also clearly reflecting compromise, could be seen as at least
partially rewarding the optimism of the architects of the 1968 Constitution.
Importantly, it seems clear that the political groundwork for this recent
change in the Cabinet was laid by the earlier amendment applying term
limits to the Cabinet officers.57 Thus, none of the elected Cabinet officials
had an incentive to oppose the amendment58 vigorously because they were
disqualified from succeeding themselves.
The two articles on the new Conservation Amendment reflect the range
of analysis that can be brought to bear on state constitutional change. The
article by Clay Henderson 9 provides a careful look at the state-specific
context-historical, political, and legal-in which the new Conservation
6 places Florida's new
Amendment fits. By contrast, John Tucker's articleW
provision in broad, comparative context, within the American state
constitutional realm, in comparison to environmental provisions in the
constitutions of other countries, and within international law. 6' The new

52. See Rundle & Mendelson, supra note 49, at 457; Williams, supra note 7, at 226-27.
53. PublicDiscontent,supra note 37, at 1313 (describing "deliberative opinion poll").
54. See, e.g., Davil B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to BearArms in State
Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177 (1995).
55. But see Little, supra note 24, at 490.
56. See Deborah K. Kearney, The FloridaCabinetin the Age ofAquarius,52 FLA.L. REV.
425 (2000). See Henretta, supra note 20, at 822-23 (tracing the growth of plural state executives);
Tarr, supra note 18, at 121-22.
57. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; Williams, supra note 6, at 722-23; P.C. Doherty, A
Quodlibet,a Mumpsimus, and the Rule of Infield Flies: The UnfinishedBusiness of Term Limits
in Florida, 18 NoVA L.REV. 921 (1994).
58. See Kearney, supra note 56, at 427-32.
59. See Clay Henderson, The ConservationAmendment, 52 FLA. L. REV. 285 (2000).
60. See John C. Tucker, ConstitutionalCodificationof an EnvironmentalEthic, 52 FLA.L.
REv. 299 (2000).
61. Interestingly, even state constitutions in other countries contain environmental provisions.
See, e.g., PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN

UNIFcATION93 (1997) ("Environmental provisions were particularlyimportantinThuringiawhich,
like Mecklenburg-Vorpommem, contains areas of great natural beauty."); CHRISTIAN STARCK, THE
CONSTITUTIONS OFTHE NEw GERMAN LANDER AND THEIR ORIGIN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 31
(1995).
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"amendment" is a wide-reaching set of related provisions building upon
the 1968 environment clause.6 2 Both articles raise the important question
of whether such provisions are self-executing. 3
Professor Tucker asserts that the adoption of the Conservation
Amendment reflects society's adoption of an "environmental ethic."' This
illustrates a general point made a number of years ago by Willard Hurst,
that "the constitutional provisions merely registered an already formed
rather than the force of law, changed the
public opinion whose weight,
65
government."
of
operations
The wide variety of provisions brought together under the Conservation
Amendment illustrate a very important distinction between constitutional
amendments proposed by the initiative, on the one hand, and amendments
proposed by constitutional conventions or the Constitution Revision
Commission on the other hand: the single-subject rule does not apply. The
rationale for this distinction is, most likely, that the convention or
Commission process permits deliberation and accommodation, whereas the
initiative process does not. As the Florida Supreme Court observed:
Under article XI, Florida Constitution, a thirty-seven member
Constitution Revision Commission is required to convene,
adopt rules of procedure, examine the constitution, hold
public hearings, and prepare a report on proposed revisions.
The report is published to the electorate prior to election. No
single-subject requirement is imposed because this process
embodies adeciuate safeguards to protect against logrolling
and deception.
The absence of a single-subject restriction on the Commission's proposals
forms the basis for one of Professor Little's major criticisms of the
commission process.67 This is a criticism that merits some serious
consideration. On the merits, it remains to be seen whether the various
provisions in the Conservation Amendment "measure up""8 in practical

62. See FIA. CONST. art. II, § 7(a).
63. See Henderson,supra note 59, at 288-89; Tucker, supranote 60, at 309-11. See generally
Jos6 L. Fernandez, State Constitutions,EnvironmentalRightsProvisions,andthe Doctrineof SelfExecution: A PoliticalQuestion?, 17 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 333 (1993).
64. Tucker, supra note 60, at 326 ("The constitutionalization of an environmental ethic is
being driven by society.").
65. JAMEsWI..ARDHuRsT,TiEGROwrHoFAMERICANLAW:THELAWMAKERS246 (1950).
66. Charter Review Comm'n of Orange County v. Scott, 647 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 1994).
67. See Little, supra note 24, at 494; see also Kelly H. Armitage, ConstitutionalRevision
CommissionsAvoid Logrolling,Don't They?, 72 FLA. B.J., Nov. 1998, at 62.
68. See J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed
Environmental QualityAmendments Don'tMeasure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999).
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terms as well as those set forth by thoughtful academic commentators.69
The areas of school finance and measures of adequate school
performance have provided one of the most important, significant, and
enduring areas of state constitutional litigation since the 1973 United
States Supreme Court decision to leave the matter to the states. 70 Recent
litigation in Florida on these issues resulted in an inconclusive decision by
the Florida Supreme Court in 1996. 7' The recent amendment to the Florida
constitution, however, seems to be the first textual change in a state
constitution aimed at these problems. The exhaustive article by Jon Mills
and Timothy McLendon analyzes the Florida amendment in light of the
litigation in other states and the texts contained in other state
constitutions. The recent Florida changes seem to respond to both the
equity and adequacy concerns that had been raised about school funding
and performance over the last generation. 3 A new round of litigation will
test Florida's school system against the new state constitutional provisions.
The judicial changes successfully proposed by the Commission, also
the product of deliberation and compromise, are ably analyzed by Martha
Barnett.74 These changes also reward the optimism of the 1968 designers
of the commission mechanism.
Although not covered in these pages, the Commission's suggested
change in the nature of a "state equal rights amendment" promises to raise
interesting questions as to whether it will "make a difference."75 New

69. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., EnvironmentalPolicy and State Constitutions:The
PotentialRole of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863 (1996) (focusing on how state
constitutions should address various environmental and natural resource issues).
70. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
71. See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400
(Fla. 1996). See E. John Wagner, Comment, FloridaConstitutionalLaw: What is the Legislature's
Duty to Providefor the State'sEducationalSystem, 49 FLA. L. REV. 339 (1997); Barbara J. Staros,
School FinanceLitigation in Florida:A HistoricalAnalysis, 23 STETSON L. REv. 497 (1994).
72. See Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting A New Standardfor Public Education:
Revision 6 Increasesthe Duty of the State to Make "Adequate Provision"forFloridaSchools, 52
FLA. L. REV. 329 (2000).
73. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational
Finance,ConstitutionalStructure,and the Separationof Powers Doctrine,33 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 281 (1998); Michael Heise, State Constitutions,School FinanceLitigation,and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995).
74. See MarthaW. Barnett, The 1997-98 FloridaConstitutionRevision CommissionJudicial
Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411 (2000); see also Joseph W. Little, An Overview
of the HistoricalDevelopment of the JudicialArticle of the FloridaConstitution, 19 STETSON L.
REV. 1 (1989).
75. Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Miflo, Does an EqualRightsAmendment Make a Difference?60
ALBANYL. REV. 1581 (1997) (analyzing whatdifference the Texas ERA has made); Paul Benjamin
Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference orMaking a Statement?, 70 TEMP.
L. REV. 907 (1997) (measuring the significance of the state equal rights provisions).
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Jersey adopted a similar provision back in 1947.76
Professor Joseph Little concludes that neither the process nor results of
Florida's commission model compare favorably with earlier constitution
revision commissions that reported to the legislature.77 Based on a number
of grounds, his criticism is at least partially based on his view that the state
constitution should legitimately limit itself to provisions structuring and
allocating governmental powers, and limiting those powers to protect the
people.78 This is, of course, the dichotomy between fundamental
constitutional material, on the one hand, and mere legislative detail on the
otherhand.79 While this distinction is always extremely important, and was
clearly on the minds of the members of the Commission, it must be
considered in light of the political situation and the specific constitutional
context within a state. Professor Frank P. Grad noted:
Recognition must, of course, be given in such an endeavor,
first, to the need for inclusion of certain "core" subjects which
common experience and tradition support as basic for the
proper functioning of state government, and second, to the
practical necessity-depending on the particular
circumstances in a state at a given time--of including other
matters so80important to the state as to call for constitutional
treatment.
Practical necessities and specific Florida constitutional context would
certainly have influenced the Commissioners to retain a constitutional
agency for environmental regulation, to utilize the constitution to
"overrule" a statute removing county authority to regulate gun sales, and
such other provisions as could be subject to the charge that they are not

76. See Robert F. Williams, The New Jersey Equal Rights Amendment: A Documentary
Sourcebook, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPrR. 69,70 (1994).

77. See Little, supra note 24, at 475.
78. See Little, supra note 24, at 478-79.
79. See Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution:It's FunctionandFormForOurTime, 54 VA.
L. REV. 928,945 (1968):
[A] consideration of the problems and criteria of constitutional inclusion and
exclusion must concern itself with a balancing of the purposes of the constitution
and the needs of government, rather than with an attempt to supply a fixed
meaning for the valuative terms "fundamental" and "legislative." It is argued here

that although there is a more or less agreed upon "core!' area of constitutional
content, criteria of inclusion and exclusion must take account of the needs of
government as conditioned by time and place.
Id.
80. Id. at 946.
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necessarily "fundamental" constitutional material. In fact, there has been
a major shift in the idea of what the function of a state constitution should
be, and what matters are important enough to be contained therein.
Christian Fritz noted this shift in the attitudes of constitution makers
during the nineteenth century as the American society and economy
became more complex, particularly with the rise of powerful corporations.
These constitutionmakers believed that they needed to include more
material in state constitutions, even if it was in areas that could,
theoretically, be governed by legislation.8 ' Professor Fritz concluded:
The key to explaining the growing length of nineteenthcentury constitutions lies in the delegates' understanding of
the purpose of constitutions. There was common agreement
that the nature and object of constitutions extended beyond
fundamental principles to what delegates called constitutional
legislation. Delegates willingly assumed an institutional role
that occasionally supplanted the ordinary legislature.
Restraining corporations and limiting governmental debt
provided the most dramatic expression of the rule of the
conventions acting in lieu of legislatures. In the case of
controlling corporate power, including the railroad
companies, conventions claimed that legislatures were
institutionally unable to respond. Moreover, many delegates
regarded the control of corporations and debt as matters on
which the people had given conventions a mandate to act. 2
The Florida Commission, of course, can claim no mandate from the people
in the same way a constitutional convention could, but it is supported by
the mandate of the people in 1968.3 In any event, the limitation of a state
constitution to "fundamental" matters is inevitably subject to political
reality, constitutional past practice within the state, and the acknowledged
additional function of a state constitution as a "tool of lawmaking."'
Professor Little's other criticisms of both the Commission process and
its accomplishments deserve careful consideration. Perhaps his most
significant, albeit controversial, recommendation is that Commission
81. See Christian G. Fritz, The American ConstitutionalTradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observationson State Constitution-Makingin the Nineteenth-CenturyWest, 25 RuTGERS L.J. 945,
964-71 (1994); Christian G. Fritz, Book Review, Rethinking the American Constitutional
Tradition:National Dimensions in the Formation of State Constitutions,26 RuTGERS L.J. 969
(1995).
82. Fritz, supra note 81, at 964-65, 968.
83. But see Little, supra note 24,at 477-78.
84. See Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw Processes, 24 WILLIAM & MARY L.
REV. 169, 175-77 (1983); see also Anatomy of Law Reform, supra note 5,at 386 n.127.
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proposals be submitted to the legislature before they are placed on the
ballot.8" This is a response to the popular sovereignty and legitimacy
questions, discussed herein, that arise with respect to the Commission
mechanism. Adoption of such a change, of course, would end the most
unique aspect of Florida's 30-year experiment with this new form of state
constitutional revision.
This Commission's success completes an effective generation of state
constitutional change at the close of the millennium, via commissions, but
the question remains whether this set of accomplished changes was worth
the price of reduced popular sovereignty. Once again, one's answer to this
process question may depend on what one thinks of the content of the
successful proposals. This, of course, may even be a mixed opinion. In any
event, Florida seems to have embraced the Jeffersonian, rather than the
Madisonian, theory that state constitutions should be reviewed and repaired
periodically so as to serve as the constitution of the living generation.86
For Madison tradition and stability gave foundational
principles their force; periodic revision would "engender
pernicious factions" and "agitate the public mind more
frequently and more violently than might be expedient." In
other words, the best-designed constitutions are created once
and then avoid later public scrutiny. Madison endorsed this
program primarily because he worried that public tampering
would affect the security of rights, especially property
rights. . . . Of course, Madison recognized that popular
sovereignty was one of the important principles constitutions
aver, but he clearly gave it secondary status. . . . This
Madisonian approach to constitutionalism leans toward a
traditionally liberal understanding of good government,
wherein rights and standing law take precedence over popular
sovereignty.
During America's formative years, not everyone wanted

85. See Little, supra note 24, at 478.
86. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, WRrnNGS 1395, 1402 (Library of America ed., 1984). Jefferson's letter is quoted in
Albert L. Sturm, The Development ofAmerican State Constitutions,12 PuBUuS: THE JOuRNALOF
FEDERALISM 57, 66 n.24 (1982). For a complete analysis of Jefferson's attitudes toward
constitutional change, see JOHNR. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT 59-78 (1992); see also Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and ConstitutionalChange:
James Madison Confronts the Possibility of ConstitutionalAmendment, 21 TEx. TECH. L. REV.
2443 (1990); Merrill D. Peterson, Mr. Jefferson's "Sovereigntyof the Living Generation,"52 VA.

Q. REv. 437 (1976). On the need for amending constitutions, see RESPONDING TO IMPERMCnON:
THE T-EoRY AND PRAcncE oFCoNSTrTUTIoNALAMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson, ed., 1995). For
a thorough consideration of Jefferson's constitutional philosophy, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 295-319 (1994).
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foundational documents to establish such an explicit value
hierarchy. Thomas Jefferson opposed Madison's ideal and
spoke disparagingly of those who "look[ed] to constitutions
with sanctimonious reverence, and deem[ed] them like the ark
of the covenant, too sacred to be touched." Although
Jefferson explicitly denied that he was "an advocate for
frequent and untried changes in laws and institutions," he
explicitly recommended that constitutions and their imbedded
principles be subject to regular popular scrutiny, knowing full
well that this would facilitate evolutionary change ...
However, the force of his case derived from his simple belief
that "each generation... has... a right to choose for itself
the form of government it believes most promotive of its own
happiness." For Jefferson, lawmaking-even the writing of
constitutional laws-belonged to the living. . . . This
Jeffersonian approach to constitutionalism endorses a far
more populist sense of good government, wherein the
people's reasoned understanding of the good state
guides-and if necessary takes precedence over-rights and
standing law.
Jefferson and Madison offered two different ways of
balancing America's allegiance to private rights and popular
sovereignty. Jefferson tipped the scales toward selfgovernment whereas Madison tipped them toward rights."
Florida, since 1968, has followed the Jeffersonian view of the need for
periodic reconsideration, which did not rely on popular sovereignty as a
stimulus for the study of state constitutional revision. Possibly, as we have
seen in modem times, the study of state constitutional revision will not
take place if it is dependent on popular sovereignty. Maybe the public
87. LAURA J. SCAUA, AMERICA'S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: REMAKING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 1820-1850, at 4-5 (1999). For another thoughtful consideration of the JeffersonMadison debate, including the ideas of Thomas Payne and others, see Stephen Holmes,
Precommitmentandthe ParadoxofDemocracy,in CONST1TUTIONAUSM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon
Elster & Rune Slagstad eds. 1988). Holmes argues that constitutionalism can reinforce democracy,
rather than always producing conflict:
Their disagreement neatly represents the quarrel-if I can put it this
way-between democrats who find constitutions a nuisance and constitutionalists
who perceive democracy as a threat. Some theorists worry that democracy will be
paralyzed by constitutional straitjacketing. Others are apprehensive that the
constitutional dyke will be breached by a democratic flood. Despite their
differences, both sides agree that there exists a deep, almost irreconcilable tension
between constitutionalism and democracy. Indeed, they come close to suggesting

that "constitutional democracy" is a marriage of opposites, an oxymoron.
Id. at 197.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss2/1

20

Williams: Foreward: Is Constitutional Law Revision Success Worth Its Popula
SYMPOSIUM FOREWORD

discontent discussed by Benjamin and Gais would prevent the adoption of
a such a mechanism now.8" The optimism of 1968 stands in stark contrast
to the current public dissatisfaction that seems to block efforts to call state
constitutional conventions. Of course, as Madison and Jefferson
understood, content and process are intertwined, and their differing views
on constitutional stability were based on pragmatic concerns as well. The
judgements of history on whether the Florida commission idea was a good
one will likewise be based on practical, rather than theoretical,
assessments.8 9
A Florida-style commission relies on popular sovereignty as a check on
the commission's proposals, rather than as a stimulus for them. After all,
the voters did reject one of the Commission's proposals. 90 This certainly
constitutes an expression of the "consent of the governed," comporting
with Locke's view of constitutionalism. 9 1Also, we have learned that the
"failed" 1978 Constitution Revision Commission was really not a failure.
Its efforts were initially checked by the electorate, but the agenda was set
for useful, piecemeal constitutional change, approved by the electorate,
over the next generation. 2 A future commission that "fails" because the
electorate exercises its checking function may still have a similar
constructive agenda-setting impact.
Is only one expression of assent by the electorate to state constitutional
change adequate as we begin the twenty-first century? Is a retrospective
popular check enough, or do we need a prospective popular stimulus as
well? Certainly the voters who wish to obtain information have greater
access now than ever before. The media and on-line interactive sources of
receiving and offering information are greater than ever, and were utilized
effectively by the recent Florida Commission. These efforts began even
before the Commission was formed. 93 A citizen's guide was published and

88. See supra notes 34, 36-41 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 34, 36-41 and accompanying text.
90. See Douglass, supra note 43, at 282.
91. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, Consent,Legitimacy and Elections:Implementing Popular
Sovereignty Underthe Lockean Constitution,52 U. PITT. L. REv. 189, 192-213 (1990).
92. See supra note 30. This phenomenon clearly has taken place in other states. See Dan
Friedman, Magnificent FailureRevisited: Modem Maryland ConstitutionalLaw from 1967 to
1998,58 MD.L. REv. 528,529 (1999) ("This Article assesses the success or failure of the Maryland

Constitutional Convention in light of the later adoption-by constitutional amendment, statute, or
regulation-of many of the important innovations proposed in the 1967-1968 constitution."); G.
Theodore Mitau, Constitutional Change by Amendment: Recommendations of the Minnesota
ConstitutionalCommission in Ten Years' Perspective,44 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1960).
93. See Mark D. Killian, ConstitutionSteering PanelLaunches EducationEffort, 23 THE
FLORIDA BAR NEWS 1 (Nov. 1, 1996) (reporting the early efforts of the foundation to educate
Floridians about the revision process and to encourage public involvement).
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disseminated. 4 The Commission published a free newsletter, including a
"Kids Page," 95 and a Web site.' Dozens of public hearings were conducted
around the state. Commission Chairman Dexter Douglass reported the
following process:
Over the past nine months I have traveled across the state
with the 37 members of the Constitution Revision
Commission in an effort to ensure that citizens of Florida do,
indeed, have a voice in making changes to our state's basic
document. Our travels took us more than 2,000 miles for 15
public hearings. We heard more than 100 hours of testimony,
from nearly 1,000 speakers.
At the public hearings last summer we considered about
600 proposals. Then the commission diligently studied the
issues, wrote them into official proposals, examined them
further in committees, voted numerous times on their merits,
and finally approved the nine revisions to go on the ballot.97
It is probably safe to say that Florida conducted the most open and
accessible review of a state constitution in the history of our country. This
is the source of the Commission's legitimacy with the living generation,
even in the absence of prospective authorization by the current generation.
Chairman Douglass would no doubt agree with Georgia governor Busbee
and
about the rigors of state constitutional revision!98 Popularparticipation
Florida
in
stimulus
popular
of
place
the
taken
have
deliberation
constitutional revision. Is this an adequate substitute?
There has been an explosion in interest group representation, both
public interest and private interest, even since the 1978 Commission met.99
94. See THE COUiNS CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, You AND FLORIDA'S CONSTITUTION
REVISION COMMISSION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO PROPOSING CHANGES FOR 1997-1998 (1996).
95. See REVISION WATCH I (Florida Constitution Revision Commission, Tallahassee, Fla.),

Sept. 1997.
96. Florida Constitution Revision Commission Web site, <http://www.law.fsu.edu/crc>
(visited Feb. 27, 2000).
97. W. Dexter Douglass, 1997-98 ConstitutionRevisionCommission:AProgressReport,72
FLA. B.J., June 1998, at 14; see also Douglass, supra note 43, at 275. Douglass' positive role as
Chair of the Commission can not be overemphasized. See CORNWELLETAL, supranote 22, at 177
("The key roles played by the presidents of the various conventions emerged unmistakably. All that
we know descriptively about convention behavior underscores the vital importance of the role of
the presiding officer.").
98. See supra note 1.
99. See A Generationof Change,supra note 5, at 138-39:
The 1977-78 Florida Constitution Revision Commission proceeded.., to engage
in one of the most open, far-reaching examinations of a state constitution, and
proposals forits change, in American history. Its proceedings were extraordinarily
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These organizations play an important two-way role in alerting and
educating their members to the possibilities of state constitutional change
and then in bringing their collective views to the Commission. By contrast,
New Jersey's quite successful 1947 Constitutional Convention met during
the summer in a college gymnasium, in relative secret." ° Such changed
circumstances and new attitudes toward, and technologies for, public
information and participation support a rethinking of state constitutional
revision processes.
Florida's "experimental laboratory"10 1 of state constitutionmaking,

well documented.
Id. On the documentation of the 1978 Commission's work, see L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting
State ConstitutionsBy Resort to the Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 567 (1978).
100. See RIcHARDJ. CONNORS, THE PROCESS OFCONSTTtUTIONALREVISIONINNEWJERSEY:
1940-1947, at 132-33, 184-85 (1970).
101. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
Id. at 311.
Interestingly, in a case eleven years before Justice Brandeis' famous statement, Justice Holmes,
in a similar context, dissented from a decision striking down a state statute. See Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). He stated, using the now-familiar metaphor:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insulated
chambersafforded by the several States, even though the experiments may seem
futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgement I most respect.
Id. (emphasis added); see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: ADIALoGUE 85-86 (1995); Maeva
Marcus, Louis D. Brandeisandthe LaboratoriesofDemocracy,in FEDERAuSM AND THE JUDICIAL
MIND 75 (Harry N. Scheibered., 1992). See generallySamuel Krislov, Oliver WendellHolmesand
the FederalIdea, in FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra at 37. Justice Brandeis also
dissented in the case, but his opinion said nothing about experiments. Eleven years later he used
the "states-as-laboratories" metaphor in the way we all now recognize. Truax, 257 U.S. at 354
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Professor James Gardner joins Earl Maltz in suggesting that the experimental model does not
really further the objectives of federalism. See James A. Gardner, The "States-As-Laboratories"
Metaphor in State ConstitutionalLaw, 30 VA. U.L. REV. 475 (1996); Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep
Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL & SOC. SCI. 98, 100-01
(1988); see also Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-JusticeBrennan and the Theory of State
ConstitutionalLaw, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988). Still, the laboratory metaphor is a
powerful one. See DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OFDEMOCRACY: ANEW BREED OFGOVERNOR
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though, continues to operate without any other states adopting it. Once
again, the climate of the times may make it impossible for the public to
exhibit the spirit of optimism underpinning the 1968 commission idea. In
any event, the substantive product of this most recent Commission has now
passed from the Commission through the voters, to the three branches of
state government and the people of Florida. Most importantly, the new
substantive provisions are in the hands of the judicial branch which will
most certainly be called upon to apply and interpret them.
Interestingly, one of the most important judicial doctrines in
interpreting the state constitution provides direct recognition of the role of
popular sovereignty in state constitutionmaking. The maxim is that the
"presumption is in favor of the natural and popular meaning in which the
words are usually understood by the people who have adopted them."'"
This judicial doctrine places emphasis only on the final expression of
popular sovereignty in state constitutional adoption, revision, or
amendment; the checking function."0 3 It is not predicated on any other
expression of voters' will, such as that authorizing a constitutional
convention or electing delegates (popular authorization). As noted earlier,
the Florida commission process relies only on this final involvement of the
voters, as a check on Commission proposals. This can be seen as a check
on both the legitimacy of the process and the content of the proposals.
Maybe it is time to acknowledge that this is the most important expression
of popular sovereignty in the process of modem state constitutionmaking,
if that process includes public deliberation and widespread public
information and access.
Florida has hit on a new balance between Jefferson's concern with the
living generation being able to form its own constitutional norms and
Madison's concern with instability of rights and the influence of public

CREATES MODELS FOR NATIONAL GROWTH (1988).

102. City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co,, 151 So. 488,489-90 (Fla. 1933) (emphasis
added). See Levinson, supra note 99, at 568-69:
The cases and literature on state constitutional interpretation seem to reflect a
strong consensus that original intent must be ascertained and respected. The
ultimate success in this endeavor would be achieved if the original intent of the
people who adopted the constitutional provision could be ascertained. If the
language of the constitutional text is clear on its face, this plain language is
deemed to have been understood by the people, and their intent is deemed to
coincide with that plain meaning. If, however, the constitutional text does not
yield a plain meaning, resort may be had to other sources in order to find the
original intent of the people.
Id.

103. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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"passion" rather than "reason."'' 4 Madison was even concerned that the
process of state constitutional revision itself would inflame passions and
stimulate the formation of factions.' 5 Could the Florida Commission's
appointed structure actually shield it from the extremes of democratic
passion that seem to underlie the modem "conventionphobia" while, at the
same time, facilitating a deliberative, independent, periodic review of the
state constitution? Does this filtering function come at too high a cost in
terms of legitimacy arising from actual public authorization, and are open
information, access, and deliberation inadequate substitutes for popular
sovereignty, serving as mere justifications for elite and professional
domination of the state constitution revision process? It must be
remembered that Florida's Commission does not supplant, but rather
merely supplements, the more familiar processes for state constitutional
amendment and revision.
These are the kinds of questions Floridians and others around the
country should be asking themselves. The answers lie both in theory and
in practice.

104. Holmes, supra note 87, at 216 (quoting Federalist No. 49). Apparently, Madison also
worried about dislocation and uncertainty if periodic review meant a complete rethinking of the
entire constitution. See id. at 217-18. Florida's Commission is certainly not required, and is
unlikely, to engage in such a zero-based constitutional revision.
105. See id. at 217-18.
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